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ABSTRACT 
 
Health Status and the Labor Force Participation Decisions of Married Couples. 
(December 2008) 
Peng Lin, B.S., Renmin University of China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Manuelita Ureta 
 
This thesis examines the labor force participation decisions of married couples, 
and special attention is paid to a spouse’s health conditions affecting their own and the 
spouse’s labor force participation decision. I used the Health and Retirement Study 
survey data and estimated a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. 
  A number of variables besides health condition were added: age, education level, 
and family unearned income.   
The results of this research paper support the findings from the relevant literature 
that the labor supply decisions of the husband and wife are related. The oldest age group 
is least likely to work. The younger the husband, the more likely it is that the husband 
will work. At the ages between 40 and 49, wives have the biggest probability to work. 
The higher the education level, the more likely it is that a spouse is going to work. The 
more total family unearned income, the less probable the spouse will go to work. Poor 
health has a negative effect on labor force participation and a positive effect for the 
spouse’s labor force participation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I examine the impact of a spouse’s health condition on his or her own labor force 
participation decision and the spouse’s labor force participation decision. I will consider 
the joint decision making of each couple.  
The health condition of family members is likely to affect significantly the labor 
market decisions made within families. It is fairly reasonable that in a married couple 
framework, if one spouse doesn’t have good health, his or her own labor force 
participation will be affected, and the other spouse might need to take more time off or 
to work extra hours to make money in order to pay hospital bills. From an economist’s 
viewpoint, there are four possible family labor force participation outcomes: 1st both 
husband and wife work, 2nd wife works husband does not, 3rd husband works wife does 
not, 4th neither of them works.  
This research topic sheds light on the effect of health outcomes on middle aged 
couples in the US. Considering the health condition affecting labor force participation is 
important because first, a lot of times, people tended to observe the more obvious 
factors, such as how many children the family has, wage rate, unearned family income, 
etc. But health condition is sometimes overlooked. Second, couples’ labor force 
participation decisions could be different from an individual’s decisions. So explore 
health factor in a household’s framework, will help discovering how couples’ labor force 
participation decisions are made.  
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Econometrics. 
2 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This topic has received attention since the 1970’s. There are a significant number 
of scholars who wrote papers dealing with family labor force participation decisions 
using different data bases and modeling techniques. In the following paragraphs, I 
summarize the relevant literature. The existing research can be categorized into two 
groups: cross-sectional data analysis in earlier research and panel data analysis in recent 
research. 
Parsons (1977)1 examined what the wife’s labor supply decisions look like when 
husbands become ill. Parsons found little empirical evidence of the husbands’ health 
having an impact on the wives’ labor supply. He also paid particular attention to health 
effects on the joint labor participation of husbands and wives and to the different labor 
participation responses of married and single men to poor health. Parsons looked at the 
time allocation of market work and home work of husband and wife and he found that 
for both husbands and wives, one's own health problems appear to lead to substantial 
market time withdrawals (about 700 hours and 350 hours, respectively) while home 
work hours remain unchanged. As one might expect, illness in one's spouse leads to 
quite different time allocation responses as men increase their home production time, 
women their market work time. These work time increases appear to come largely from 
leisure time in both cases. 
                                                 
1 Parsons, D. O., 1977, Health, family structure, and labor supply, American Economic Review 
67, 703-712. 
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In both the Berger (1983)2 and Berger and Fleisher (1984)3’s papers, they report 
that a husband’s disability has a positive effect on the wife’s labor force participation 
and working hours. While Berger (1983) found negative effects of a wife’s disability on 
the labor force participation and hours worked of the husband. 
Berger and Fleisher (1984) examined the labor supply response by the wife over 
time to deterioration in the husband’s health. Unlike previous studies using cross 
sectional data, longitudinal data were used which allows responses over time to be 
examined directly. They report that transfer income after the husband’s deterioration of 
health has an important effect over the decision of the wife’s labor force participation. 
As available payments increase relative to the husband’s pre-disability market wage, the 
wife eventually decreases instead of increasing her market work. When this happens, the 
net loss in family income is small enough to be outweighed by the increase in the 
husband’s need for care at home, thus causing the wife to reduce her labor market 
activities. When transfer payments replaced enough of the lost earnings of the husband, 
the wife was able to reduce her market work in order to care for the husband at home.  
In recent years, more research has been done using panel data. Using the Retirement 
History Survey, and fitting a multivariate probit model, Blau (1998)4 used panel data for 
the cohort of individuals aged 55 and over from 1969 to 1979 to estimate the labor force 
dynamics of older couples. By examining the movement among the four employment 
                                                 
2 Berger, M. C., 1983, Labor supply and spouse's health: the effects of illness, disability, and 
mortality, Social Science Quarterly 64, 494-509. 
3 Berger, M. C. and B. M, Fleisher, 1984, Husband's health and wife's labor Supply, Journal of 
Health Economics 3, 63-75. 
4 Blau, D. M, 1998, Labor force dynamics of older married couples, Journal of Labor Economics 
16, 595-629. 
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states (both employed, husband only employed, wife only employed, or neither 
employed), Blau (1998) found poor health of a given spouse had large negative effects 
on the individual’s labor market entry rate and large positive effects on the individual’s 
labor market exit rate. And the own health effect was larger for husbands than for wives. 
In addition, Blau argued that the health insurance provided by the wife’s employer might 
be important to the couple, given the employment status of the couple.  
Following Blau 1998, Blau and Riphahn (1999)5, using the German Socio-
Economic Panel, fitted a competing risk hazard model to capture the labor force 
transitions in discrete time of married couples with at least one spouse in the age range 
of 50-69 in Germany. They included economic variables, education and household 
characteristics, and health as explanatory variables. For health variables, they found that 
wives were less likely to exit the labor force and more likely to enter the labor force if 
the husband had a chronic condition and was still working, and were more likely to exit 
and less likely to enter if the husband had left the labor force. The same pattern does not 
hold for men. Husbands were less likely to stop employment and less likely to reenter 
employment if the wife had a health condition, a response that was independent of the 
wife’s labor force status. 
In the 2000’s, there are 2 papers on family labor supply decisions, using the 
Health and Retirement Survey data.  
                                                 
5 Blau, D. M. and R. T.  Riphahn, 1999, Labor force transitions of older married couples in 
Germany, Labour Economics 6, 229-251. 
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In 2003, Pienta6 used the first two waves of the HRS data, and fitted a 
multinomial logit model in order to capture the labor force transitions of married men 
and women. She finds that married individuals were less likely to be observed as retired 
if their spouse reported a disability than if the spouse were not disabled. However, 
because she modeled husbands and wives separately, some commentators have argued 
that this modeling strategy could not completely characterize the labor force choices 
facing a family.  
In 2004, Berger and Pelkowski7 used joint modeling, and pointed out that if both 
spouses were working and one spouse experienced a health problem, the other spouse 
was likely to remain working while the spouse with the health problem was likely to 
drop out of the labor force. If neither was working and one spouse experienced a health 
problem, the other spouse was unlikely to return to work.  
                                                 
6 Pienta, A.M., 2003, Partners in marriage: an analysis of husbands’ and wives’ retirement 
behavior, Journal of Applied Gerontology 22, 340-358. 
7 Berger, Mark C. and J.M. Pelkowski, 2004, Health and family labor force transitions, Quarterly 
Journal of Business & Economics 42, 113-138. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Labor-Leisure Choice Model  
3.1.1 Work and Leisure 
The decision to work is ultimately a decision about how to spend time. In the 
labor-leisure choice model, economists simplify the problem by focusing on the 
allocation of time to either leisure or work. Leisure is pleasurable leisure activities 
generating well-being. Work refers to work for pay in the labor market. Work around the 
home for household production is typically treated as leisure time.  
3.1.2 Utility Curves and Budget Constraints 
Depending on the opportunity cost of leisure, a person’s wealth level, and 
preferences, one can allocate time in different combinations of work and leisure, while 
maintaining the same level of satisfaction. That is, the utility level stays the same. 
Different shapes of the indifference curves depict people’s preference differences. 
People will be happy to have as high a utility level as possible. In Figure 1, utility level 
B is higher than utility level A’, and utility level A’ is higher than utility level A.  
Economists believe that resources that anyone can command are limited. Each 
person is facing a budget constraint, which defines the highest and the lowest income a 
person can earn, giving different working hours.  
In Figure 1, any work-leisure combination within the southwest and along the 
budget constraint is obtainable, while any point beyond northeast of the budget 
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constraint is unobtainable. A person seeking the highest obtainable utility level will 
choose point N as the best work-leisure combination.8  
  
Figure 1 Indifference Curves and Budget Constraint9 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Labor Force Participation Decision 
The analysis above assumed that people work at least some hours. However, 
there are some people who don’t work at all.  
As illustrated in Figure 2 some people will have utility curves so steep (that is, 
preferences for leisure so strong) that there is no point of tangency with ED. For these 
                                                 
8 Enrenberg R.G. and R.S. Smith, 2005, Modern labor economics: Theory and public policy, 
(New York: Pearson Addison Wesley) 178-179. 
9 Enrenberg R.G. and R.S. Smith, 2005, Modern labor economics: Theory and public policy, 
(New York: Pearson Addison Wesley) 179. 
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people, utility is maximized at the “corner” (point D). They desire no work at all and 
therefore are not in the labor force. 
 
 
Figure 2 The Decision Not to Work Is a “Corner Solution”10 
 
 
 
An implication of the labor-leisure model is that if people who are not in the 
labor force place a value of X on the marginal hour of leisure greater than the market 
wage rate. Because they will “reserve” their labor unless the wage is X or more, 
economists say that they have a reservation wage of X. The reservation wage, then, is 
the wage below which a person will not work, and in the labor/leisure context it 
represents the value placed on an hour of lost leisure time.  
                                                 
10 Enrenberg R.G. and R.S. Smith, 2005, Modern labor economics: Theory and public policy, 
(New York : Pearson Addison Wesley) 181. 
 
9 
 
Refer back to Figure 2 the reason that person remained out of the labor force was 
because the wage was everywhere lower than her or his marginal value of leisure time. 
3.2 Joint Decision within the Household 
For those who live with a spouse, some kind of joint decision-making process 
must be used to allocate the time of each spouse and to agree on who does what in the 
household. Noticed here, we extract the household production time from working time. 
So every household is facing a tripartite choice: market work, household work, and 
leisure.  
Economic theory suggests the following decisions that all households must make.  
First, find the specialization of function for each spouse. An individual’s 
productivity differs at home and at work. By letting the person who has a higher wage 
rate work longer hours, and the person who is more productive at home do more 
household work, the whole family is better off. Thus, decisions about household labor 
force participation must be made in full consideration of the market and household 
productivity of both partners. 
Second, take a look at changes in the behavior of one spouse. Consider if one 
spouse decides to participate in the labor force, the other spouse’s reaction may go in 
two opposite directions, called cross-effect. If the two spouses are substitute in the 
household production of commodities, then the other spouse will decrease the hours 
worked or in an extreme case, drop out of the labor force in order to substitute the chores 
that the other spouse used to perform. If they are complementary in the consumption of 
household commodities, then the other spouse will increase hours worked or start to 
10 
 
participate in the labor market as well. Again, theory cannot predict whether the spouses 
are substitutes or complements in household production and consumption. Similarly, it is 
impossible to say which cross-effect will dominate if their signs conflict. There is yet no 
real consensus on the sizes and signs of these cross-effects for husbands and wives.   
Third, deal with the situation where one spouse is forced out of market work. The 
spouse who lost a job while still actively looking for one is considered as unemployed. 
The other spouse has two possible responses: on one hand, is to increase the labor supply 
or to participate in the labor force in order to maintain the family income. On the other 
hand, the limited resource, such as the limited job openings, the skills sets of a job 
seeker, might force the spouse to remain or reduce her or his market labor supply level 
or continue to stay at home.  
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4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
The econometric model that I use is the Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit. 
The reason for using this model is the nature of the research question.   
First, the model has to be based on probit, because I am modeling binary 
responses.  The dependent variable is whether a married person is going to participate in 
the labor force or not.  Using the latent variable model, letting y* be an unobserved, or 
latent variable, determined by y*= β0 + xβ+ e, y=1[y*>1]. The notation 1[.] is to define a 
binary outcome. The function y=1[.] is called the indicator function, which takes on the 
value one if the event in brackets is true, and zero otherwise. Therefore, y is one if y* > 0, 
and y is zero if y* < 0.  The x is a set of variables in the estimation. I assume that e is 
independent of x and that e either has the standard logistic distribution or the standard 
normal distribution. In either case, e is symmetrically distributed about zero. Economists 
tend to favor the normality assumption for e, which is why the probit model is more 
popular than logit model in econometrics.11 
Second, I choose a bivariate model, because there are two probit equations to be 
modeled, the one for the wife and the other for the husband, and their disturbances (error 
terms) are correlated. The couples’ decision of joining the labor force depends on one 
another, and they could not be estimated separately. 
The general specification for a two-equation model is:12 
                                                 
11Wooldridge J. M., 2003, Introductory econometrics, (Australia ; Cincinnati, Ohio : South-
Western College Publishing) 616-635. 
12 Greene W.H., 2008, Econometric Analysis, (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall) 
817. 
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y1*= X1* β1+ e1, y1=1 [y1*>0]                                         (4.1) 
y2*= X2* β2+ e2, y2=1 [y2*>0]                                         (4.2) 
E[e1| X1, X2]=E[e2| X1, X2]=0                                           (4.3) 
var[e1| X1, X2]= var[e2| X1, X2]= 1                                    (4.4) 
Cov[e1, e2| X1, X2]=rho                                                    (4.5) 
In equation (4.1) and (4.2), y1* and y2* are defined using the latent variable model 
that satisfies the classical linear model assumptions: Linear in Parameters, Random 
Sampling, Zero Conditional Mean, Sample Variation in the independent variable, 
Homoskedasticity, and Serial Independence. 
The yi is one if yi* >0, and y is zero if yi* = 0, where i=1 or 2. 
The X1 and X2 are used to denote the full set of explanatory variables, such as (Xi1, 
Xi2, Xi3,…, Xik), where i=1 or 2. 
The β1 and β2 are sets of coefficients for X1 and X2. 
The ei are independent from x, and have standard normal distribution, given both 
X1 and X2, which in mathematical form is written as equations (4.3) and (4.4). 
The equation (4.5) denotes that the disturbances of equation (4.1) and (4.2) are 
correlated, given both X1 and X2, with a correlation coefficient p. In STATA, rho is 
calculated indirectly from “athrho”. The relationship between “rho” and “athrho” is 
expressed in the equation below:   
athrho=(1/2)*{ln[(1+ rho)/(1-rho)]}                                 (4.6) 
Third, I use seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model because it allows 
different independent variables to be put as estimation variables in the equations. For 
13 
 
example, the wife’s age appears only in her equation, because husband’s labor force 
participation is not quite related with his wife’s age. Their ages have a significant 
influence on their own labor force participation decisions. However, the health levels of 
both spouses are included into both equations, since I am hoping to find that a spouse’s 
health condition will influence the other spouse’s labor force participation decision.  
14 
 
5. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
5.1 Data Description 
I use the Health and Retirement Study survey data. The targeted respondents of 
the HRS13 are the non-institutionalized men and women born between 1931 and 1941 
residing in the United States. Partners of the original targeted sample are also 
interviewed, even if not initially age eligible. There are altogether 7 waves of data, 
containing 7 different times of interviews.  
I chose the first wave of the data, whose interviews were carried out in 1992-
1993. I chose wave 1 instead of wave 2 or wave 3 is because in the first wave, 
interviewers asked “does your health affect or limit any work?”. This question generated 
a very important variable in measuring the health condition “whether health limits 
work”, which I used as the health condition variable in the research of this paper. But 
they did not ask this question again in the second and the third wave. Second, I choose 
wave 1, instead of wave 4 or the waves after, is because the interviews in wave 4 are 
carried out in 1998, which is 5 years later after the interviews of the first wave.14 By the 
time, the average interviewee’s age was around 60 or over. And the age distribution in 
the waves after the fourth wave is even older. So I believe that the average age of the 
observations in the first wave is younger and more suitable for the specific research topic 
than other waves.  
                                                 
13 The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant 
number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan.  
14 Clair, P. and D. Blake, 2007, RAND HRS Data Documentation, Retrieved April 8, 2008, from 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/meta/rand/randhrsg/randhrsg.pdf 13, 261. 
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I modified the data as follows: I kept the data for married couples, with both 
spouse present. I dropped the data for couples when either of them is above the age of 
62.  
5.2 Description of Variables 
5.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is an indicator for labor force status. It is equal to 1 if the 
person is working for pay or unemployed. It is equal to 0 if an individual is partly 
retired, retired, disabled, or not in labor force. The label for wife is “wifework”. The 
label for husband is “husbandwork”. 
5.2.2 Independent Variables  
5.2.2.1 Demographic Information 
The reasons of including age are the following. People’s labor force participation 
decisions differ in different age groups. At young ages, individuals tend to stay in school. 
Middle people tend to participate in the labor force. In the later age period, people tend 
to retire.  
The ages of wives and husbands are grouped into 4 categories. For each category, 
there is a corresponding dummy variable.  
I define a binary variable “w_age1” to equal to one if a wife’s age is between 23 
and 39, and zero otherwise. Similarly, “h_age1” is defined to equal to one if a husband’s 
age is between 23 and 39, and zero otherwise. The “w_age 2” is defined to equal to one 
if a wife’s age is between 40 and 49, and zero otherwise. The “h_age 2” is defined to 
equal to one if a husband’s age is between 40 and 49, and zero otherwise. The “w_age3” 
16 
 
is defined to equal to one if a wife’s age is between 50 and 55 and zero otherwise. The 
“h_age 3” is defined to equal to one if a husband’s age is between 50 and 55, and zero 
otherwise.  The “w_age4” is defined to equal to one if a wife’s age is between 56 and 
62, and zero otherwise. The “h_age 4” is defined to equal to one if a husband’s age is 
between 56 and 62, and zero otherwise. 
The category of age between 56 and 62 is assigned as the reference group. 
5.2.2.2 Human Capital and Education Variables  
The reason I include people’s education level into the estimation is because 
people’s labor force participation decisions differ across different education levels. For 
example, my aunt who is an elementary school graduate has never worked in her whole 
life. My grandpa, a college graduate, didn’t retire until he was 80.  
The education levels of husbands and wives are grouped into 5 categories. For each 
category, there is a corresponding dummy variable.  
I define a binary variable “w_eduLThighschool” to equal one if a wife’s 
education level is less than high school, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
“h_eduLThighschool” is defined to equal one if a husband’s education level is less than 
high school, and zero otherwise. The “w_eduGED” is defined to equal one if a wife is 
GED15 holder, and zero otherwise. The “h_eduGED” is defined to equal one if a 
husband’s education level is recognized as GED holder, and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
15 GED is the acronym for General Educational Development. A certificate awarded to a person 
who successfully passes exams measuring their educational level. The GED certificate is equivalent to a 
high school diploma. But in this paper, GED is considered as an education level higher than less than high 
school, but lower than high school graduates level.  
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The “w_eduHSgraduate” is defined to equal one if a wife is a high school graduate, and 
zero otherwise. The “h_eduHSgraduate” is defined to equal one if a husband is a high 
school graduate, and zero otherwise. The “w_eduLC” is defined to equal one if a wife 
has some college education, and zero otherwise.  The “h_eduLC” is defined to equal one 
if a husband has some college education, and zero otherwise. The “w_eduC” is defined 
to equal one if a wife graduated from college, and zero otherwise. The “h_eduC” is 
defined to equal one if a husband graduated from college, and zero otherwise.  
The most frequent education level in the sample is high school graduate (wives 38.79%, 
husbands 29.96%), so high school graduates are chosen to be the reference group.  
5.2.2.3 Couples’ Financial Situation 
I also include Non-labor income in the probit equations, because if one’s family 
is richer, holding other factors constant, the probability for that person to participate into 
the labor force is lower than the person whose family is poorer.  From the household’s 
perspective, if a person’s spouse earns more income, this will make that person less 
likely to participate in the labor force.  
I constructed the variable, “household unearned income”, defined as “total 
household income” minus the sum of “wife’s income” and “husband’s income”, if 
applicable. The natural logs of the (income+1) are taken, in order to avoid generating 
missing variables, since family income could be zero. I use the natural log of the 
household unearned income instead of the dollar amount because using a transformation, 
18 
 
especially taking the log, yields a distribution that is closer to normal. 16This variable is 
labeled as “lnhh_unearnedincome”. 
 
5.2.2.4 Couples’ Health 
There are various ways of measuring health in the HRS data. I choose to use 
“whether health limits work” to measure whether health conditions limit participating in 
the labor force or not. If health conditions limit work, then “whether health limits work” 
takes the value one, otherwise, takes the value zero. For wives, this variable is labeled as 
“ w_healthlimitwork”. For husbands, this variable is labeled as “h_healthlimitwork”.  
 
                                                 
16 Wooldridge J. M., 2003, Introductory econometrics, (Australia ; Cincinnati, Ohio : South-
Western College Publishing) 114. 
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6.   RESULTS 
 
6.1   Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis 
Table 1 lists the variables used in the analysis. Among all the variables, the 
“unearned household income” is the only continuous variable. The other variables are 
indicator variables, which take the value of 0 or 1. 60.5% of wives and 78.6% of 
husbands reported that they were working or unemployed during the survey period.  
There are very few husbands (0.23%) of age 23 to 39, while the wives’ proportion is 
relatively larger (2.67%). The largest age group for wives is from 50 to 55. The largest 
age group for the husband is from 56 to 62.  
Regarding education level, the largest group is high school graduates for both 
wives (38.8%) and husbands (29.9%). For wives, the second largest group is less than 
high school (21.05%), third largest is less than college (20.7%), the fourth is college 
graduate (14.91%). For husbands, the second largest group is less than high school 
(23.98%), third largest is college graduate (21.27%), and the fourth is less than college 
(19.11%). 
Regarding health, 16.99% of wives and 19.06% of husbands reported their health 
limits them from going to work. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max number of people 
husbandwork 7790 0 1 6123.993987
wifework 7790 0 1 4712.530898
h_age1 7790 0 1 17.967635
w_age1 7790 0 1 207.62687
h_age2 7790 0 1 233.580034
w_age2 7790 0 1 1912.562629
h_age3 7790 0 1 3572.57969
w_age3 7790 0 1 3523.667059
h_age4 7790 0 1 3965.872641
w_age4 7790 0 1 2146.142663
lnhh_unearnedincome 7790 6.278105 4.101887 0 13.80849
h_healthlimitwork 7790 0 1 1484.856574
w_healthlimitwork 7790 0 1 1323.640966
h_eduLThighschool 7790 0 1 1870.638407
w_eduLThighschool 7790 0 1 1641.050748
h_eduGED 7790 0 1 443.203481
w_eduGED 7790 0 1 346.377676
h_eduHSgraduate 7790 0 1 2329.812946
w_eduHSgraduate 7790 0 1 3022.568298
h_eduLC 7790 0 1 1490.321259
w_eduLC 7790 0 1 1618.09206
h_eduC 7790 0 1 1656.023907
w_eduC 7790 0 1 1161.911997  
 
6.2   Presentation and Discussion of the Estimates 
 General equation:  
P(y=1|x)= Φ (β0 + β 1 X1 +  … + β 9X9 + e)= Φ(β 0+x β +e) 
 On the left hand side of the equation, P denotes a probability taking values 
strictly between zero and one. 
 On the right hand side of the equation, Φ denotes a normal distribution function. 
B0 is the constant term. x is a set of explanatory variables, including age, education 
levels, total  unearned income, and a person and the spouse’s health. The husband’s set 
is slight different from the wife’s set. β represents the coefficient set.  
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 Listed in Table 2, from the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model 
estimation, the estimated rho17  is 0.17903, with a standard error of 0.02374 this result 
implies that the error terms of two estimated equations are significantly, positively 
related. This also signifies that the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model fitting 
method is an appropriate. Because if the rho is insignificant, then the husband and the 
wife’s labor force participation decision is not jointly made. The significantly positive 
rho also indicates that if other variables not included in the estimation, such as 
workaholic, or like to play instead of work, tend to be correlated. That is, both spouses 
tend to be workaholic together. From a long term point, husbands and wives, tended to 
plan their retirements together.  
The age coefficients are all positive. This implies relative to reference group (age from 
56 to 62), the probabilities for the other age groups to be in the labor force are higher.  
Listed in Table 3 and Table 4, from the marginal effects’ view point, if a wife’s 
age is between 50 and 55, compared to the reference group the estimated probability that 
she participates in the labor force will increase by 0.09158, which is the biggest increase 
among all age group. Since the coefficient for husband’s age between 23 and 39 is very 
insignificant, combine the age group 1 and 2 for husband is suggested. 
 Relative to the reference group, high school graduates, the patterns of the other 
education levels of wives and husbands are different.  
For wives, only the less than high school group has a negative coefficient, -
0.3653, that is, if a female’s education falls in this group, the probability for her 
                                                 
17 For method of calculating rho, please see page 20, or equation (4.6). 
22 
 
participating in the labor force is smaller than the reference group. The marginal effects 
table shows that the estimated probability decreases by 0.1426 from the reference 
group’s probability. 
However, the other education groups all have positive coefficients compared to 
reference group, β (w_eduGED)=0.33707, β (w_eduLC)=0.16846, β (w_eduC)=0.3476, 
that is, if a wife’s education falls into one of these 3 education levels, the probability for 
her to participate into the laborforce is higher than if she is a high school graduate. And 
the marginal effects table shows that the estimated probability increases compared with 
the reference group are 0.1216, 0.06346 and 0.12704, corresponding to each age group. 
Notice here, the GED and the college graduates have higher effect on the wife’s decision 
of participate in the labor force. 
For husbands, if the education level is lower than the high school graduates, with 
coefficients of β (h_edu LTHighschool)= -0.1608 and β (h_eduGED= -0.112, this 
indicates that the probability of him participating in the labor force is smaller than the 
reference group, by 0.0389 and 0.0026.  If the education level is higher than the high 
school graduates, with coefficients of β (h_eduLC)=0.10861 and β (h_eduC)=0.13732, 
this indicates that the probability of him participating in the labor force is bigger than the 
reference group,  by 0.02433 and 0.03057. 
The negative coefficients for the total household income are -0.1116 and -0.0295. 
These results indicate that the increase of total unearned household income will cause 
the probability of household’s participation in the labor market going down. Thus if total 
unearned household income increases by 10%, probability of wives participate in the 
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labor force is predicted to decrease by (0.1116 /100)*(10)=0.01116; probability of 
husbands participate in the labor force is predicted to decrease by 
(0.0295/100)*(10)=0.00295. 
 The coefficient of w_healthlimitwork is -0.8198 in wife’s equation. The 
coefficient of h_healthlimitwork is -1.3512 in husband’s equation. These two negative 
numbers mean if a person has a health problem that limits work, then the probability for 
her or him going to work will be lower than the person who doesn’t have a health 
problem that limit work. In fact, the estimated probability decrease for “unhealthy” 
wives compared with the “healthier” wives is 0.3181. The estimated probability decrease 
for “unhealthy” husbands compared with the “healthier” husbands is 0.4239.  
The positive coefficients, h_healthlimitwork, 0.03172, in wife’s equation, and 
w_healthlimitwork, 0.02569, in husband’s equation mean that if a person’s spouse has a 
health problem that limits work, the person’s probability of participating in the labor 
force will be higher than the person who doesn’t have a spouse who has a health 
problem that limits work. The estimated probability increase is 0.01211 for wives who 
don’t have a healthy husband and 0.00591 for husbands who don’t have a healthy wife, 
compared to the reference status, which is having a “healthy” spouse.  But the 
coefficients are not significant.  
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Table 2 
Summary of Estimate Results 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   = 7790
                                                  Wald chi2(20)   =    2575.88
Log likelihood = -7629.0225                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
wifework     
h_healthlimitwork 0.0317246 0.0391053 0.81 0.42 -0.04492 0.1083696
w_healthlimitwork -0.819765 0.04054 -20.22 0.00 -0.899222 -0.740308
w_age1 0.2071076 0.0954198 2.17 0.03 0.0200882 0.3941271
w_age2 0.5638391 0.0426972 13.21 0.00 0.4801541 0.6475241
w_age3 0.2405197 0.0357078 6.74 0.00 0.1705336 0.3105057
w_eduLThighschool -0.365292 0.0401899 -9.09 0.00 -0.444062 -0.286521
w_eduGED 0.3370711 0.0768884 4.38 0.00 0.1863726 0.4877697
w_eduLC 0.1684607 0.0408283 4.13 0.00 0.0884387 0.2484827
w_eduC 0.3476026 0.0474794 7.32 0.00 0.2545447 0.4406604
lnhh_unearnedincome -0.029509 0.0038078 -7.75 0.00 -0.036973 -0.022046
_cons 0.327423 0.0424836 7.71 0.00 0.2441567 0.4106893
husbandwork  
h_healthlimitwork -1.351227 0.0415739 -32.5 0.00 -1.43271 -1.269744
w_healthlimitwork 0.0256907 0.0488163 0.53 0.60 -0.069988 0.1213689
h_age1 6.985201 21783.93 0 1.00 -42688.74 42702.71
h_age2 0.8900233 0.1426226 6.24 0.00 0.6104882 1.169558
h_age3 0.4790318 0.0386924 12.38 0.00 0.4031961 0.5548675
h_eduLThighschool -0.160771 0.0501883 -3.2 0.00 -0.259139 -0.062404
h_eduGED -0.011168 0.0824691 -0.14 0.89 -0.172804 0.1504688
h_eduLC 0.1086094 0.054904 1.98 0.05 0.0009994 0.2162193
h_eduC 0.1373186 0.0528408 2.6 0.01 0.0337524 0.2408847
lnhh_unearnedincome -0.111567 0.0054468 -20.48 0.00 -0.122242 -0.100891
_cons 1.721623 0.0567281 30.35 0.00 1.610438 1.832808
/athrho 0.1809756 0.0245304 7.38 0 0.1328969 0.2290542
rho 0.1790253 0.0237442 0.13212 0.2251307
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  54.8814    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
25 
 
Table 3 
Marginal Effects for Wife’s Equation 
Marginal effects after biprobit
      y  = Pr(wifework=1) (predict, pmarg2)
         =  .61277636
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [    95% C.I.   ] X
h_healthlimitwork* 0.01211 0.01489 0.81 0.416 -0.0171 0.04129 0.19076
w_healthlimitwork* -0.3181 0.01494 -21.3 0 -0.3473 -0.2888 0.17009
w_age1* 0.07662 0.03387 2.26 0.024 0.01024 0.143 0.0267
w_age2* 0.2029 0.01411 14.38 0 0.17525 0.23055 0.24596
w_age3* 0.09158 0.01349 6.79 0 0.06514 0.11802 0.45186
w_eduLThighschool* -0.1426 0.01582 -9.01 0 -0.1736 -0.1116 0.21053
w_eduGED* 0.1216 0.02567 4.74 0 0.07129 0.17191 0.04454
w_eduLC* 0.06346 0.01509 4.2 0 0.03388 0.09304 0.20783
w_eduC* 0.12704 0.01634 7.78 0 0.09502 0.15906 0.14917
lnhh_unearnedincome -0.0113 0.00146 -7.75 0 -0.0142 -0.0084 6.28083
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
 
Table 4 
Marginal Effects for Husband’s Equation 
Marginal effects after biprobit
      y  = Pr(husbandwork=1) (predict, pmarg1)
         =  .85104848
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [    95% C.I.   ] X
h_healthlimitwork* -0.4239 11.413 -0.04 0.97 -22.792 21.9445 0.19076
w_healthlimitwork* 0.00591 0.31233 0.02 0.985 -0.6063 0.61807 0.17009
h_age1* 0.15273 0.00488 31.3 0 0.14317 0.16229 0.00231
h_age2* 0.1268 8.73031 0.01 0.988 -16.984 17.2379 0.03004
h_age3* 0.10901 5.70999 0.02 0.985 -11.082 11.3004 0.45879
h_eduLThighschool* -0.0389 1.95396 -0.02 0.984 -3.8686 3.79075 0.2398
h_eduGED* -0.0026 0.13721 -0.02 0.985 -0.2715 0.26633 0.05674
h_eduLC* 0.02433 1.31454 0.02 0.985 -2.5521 2.60077 0.19114
h_eduC* 0.03057 1.65963 0.02 0.985 -3.2223 3.28339 0.21271
lnhh_unearnedincome -0.0259 1.3566 -0.02 0.985 -2.6848 2.633 6.28083
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
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7.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In the family framework, decisions of both spouses are jointly made, especially 
the participation decision. They behave in a way that works best for their family, and 
when health problem enters the family, they tend to look after each other, such as work 
more hours and let the other spouse has more time at home, etc. This agrees with the 
findings of the relevant literature. 
There are similar trends for both spouses. First, if an individual’s spouse’s has a 
poor health condition, the likelihood of that participating in the labor force is lower. This 
is the same as most of the relevant literature. The other spouse will be more possible to 
participate. This is the same as Blau (1998) and Pienta 2003’s results. Others found that 
when husband can’t work the wife will stay home more. Second, the age group of 56-62 
has the lowest labor force participation rate. Third, if an individual’s spouse has a higher 
education level, the likelihood of that individual participating in the labor force is higher. 
Fourth, the increase of total unearned household income will cause the probability of 
household’s participation in the labor market going down.  
 There are also some differences between spouses. First, there is an age 
difference. Wives’ highest probability of participating into the labor force happens when 
they are between 40 and 49. Husbands tend to participate less as they get older. Second, 
wives’ holding GED or a college degree, are more likely to participate. Instead, the 
higher is the education level, the more likely it is that the husband will participate.  
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